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August 13, 2008

Mortgages in America, a people's History

A breif history of subprime mortgage.

But any industry this big was soon irresistible to speculators. In several waves of deregulation, the industry set out to fix something that wasn't broken and managed to slip outside the bounds of government banking supervision. In each of these cycles, free-marketers promised greater efficiency and more plentiful credit, if government regulators would just get out of the way. In each episode, however, the result has instead been increased speculation followed by huge losses and costs to the public.

Robert Kuttner

August 4, 2008

Housing Wire

Housingwire is a lively news source for the mortgage and residential real estate industries.

July 8, 2008

Mortgage Lender Implode-O-Meter tallies failed lenders

The Implode-O-Meter is the brainchild of Aaron Krowne, a former researcher
at Emory University in Atlanta. A computer scientist and mathematician,
Mr. Krowne, 28, started the site in 2007, believing that the troubles in the
housing market, and by extension the mortgage industry, would worsen.

He was right -- and the Implode-O-Meter took off. Traffic on the site soared,
reaching as many as 100,000 regular visitors, and advertising dollars rolled in.
Mr. Krowne quit his day job and hired 10 people for his company, Implode-Explode Heavy Industries.

"The crisis has come in waves," Mr. Krowne said. "It just keeps coming."

Business: Loan Pains Turned Site Into a Hit
By LOUISE STORY
Published: July 8, 2008
The Mortgage Lender Implode-O-Meter, a Web site, is gleefully tallying the
number of lenders that run into trouble.

July 6, 2008

FDIC bank data of loans secured by real estate

The RC-C section in a FDIC CALL report shows loans secured by
real estate. Manually add up the various detail lines in RC-C,
subheading 1, to get the totals.


Total Assets - $2.118B
(RC-C.1) Loans secured by real estate $1.360B ( 64.2% )

Where does one get the RC-C.1 data?

Each bank submits CALL data to the FDIC on a quarterly basis.
The data usually becomes available 15-30 days after the quarter
ends.

Search for banks and download/view as PDF data at the FDIC
Institution Directory
.

[Via CR/Comments]

May 21, 2008

ARMs in Wachovia's closet

ARM (negative amortization option pay adjustable rate mortgages)
sales training at World Savings:

"So if I'm paying that minimum payment, I'm not actually
putting a dent in my principal though right? My principal and
interest they're just going to keep climbing up right?" the
borrower asks in the video tape. "It's optional," the broker
in the video replied.

Oakland, California's Golden West Financial Corp., the No. 2 U.S.
savings and loan specialized in ARMs, which comprise about
99 percent of its mortgage lending.

World Savings and Golden West are both now part of Wachovia.


October 22, 2007

Converting ARMs to fixed rate mortgages: required ?

"Save the borrower" legislative proposals abound. And,

Sheila Bair, chairman of the FDIC, who proposed yesterday
that mortgage servicers freeze all adjustable rate mortgages
facing resets at their current rates.


Naked Capitalism thinks such
forbearance is doomed.

September 22, 2007

Subprime fixed rate mortgage performance

Subprime fixed rate mortgages are performing OK.

Continue reading "Subprime fixed rate mortgage performance" »

September 21, 2007

piggyback ratings reconsidered

The firms say that since first asked to rate securities based on subprime
loans more than a decade ago, they've done the best they could with the
data they've had. "The housing market has proven to be weaker than a
lot of expectations," says Warren Kornfeld, co-head of residential
mortgage-backed securities at Moody's. This summer, the firms
downgraded hundreds of mortgage bonds built on subprime mortgages.
They say those bonds represent only a small part of the subprime-mortgage
market.

Continue reading "piggyback ratings reconsidered" »

August 13, 2007

Federal Reserve 'purchases' mortgages backed securities ?

Q. Over the last couple of days the Times and other publications
have reported that the Federal Reserve has injected $68 billion
into the equities markets and that foreign central banks, such
as the ECB, have pumped even larger amounts of capital into
their markets.

Could you tell me precisely how this is done? Are the central
banks simply printing money to purchase the CDO’s other debt
instruments
that nobody else wants to touch? If so, isn’t this
just a way of socializing the costs of bad investment through
inflation? Finally, didn’t this whole mess begin with too much
liquidity and reckless lending practices?


The Fed injects money into banks by lending dollars on the
security of high quality assets held by banks. Under the
rules central banks now follow, this is almost an automatic
action.

The Fed sets a target on the federal funds rate — the rate
on loans between banks. If the market rate rises above that
rate, it is a sign that demand for funds is greater than anticipated,
and the Fed meets the demand. Similarly, it withdraws loans if
the rate falls below that level. There was an interesting twist
on one day, in that the Fed asked that the security for loans be
mortgage securities, but those are of the type issued by Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac, not the ones that are now questionable.
Because the Fed is not lending against bad securities, it is not
bailing out anyone. But that move enables banks to lend to
customers who own securities that cannot be sold right now.

Floyd Norris

August 2, 2007

Mortgage Rate Rest Peak, 2007-2008

The peak month for the resetting of mortgages will come this October,
according to Credit Suisse, when more than $50 billion in mortgages
will switch to a new rate for the first time. The level will remain above
$30 billion a month through September 2008. In all, the interest rates
on about $1 trillion worth of mortgages, or 12 percent of the nation’s
total, will reset for the first time this year or next.

A couple of years ago, by comparison, only a marginal amount of
mortgage debt — a few billion dollars a month — was resetting each
month.

Continue reading "Mortgage Rate Rest Peak, 2007-2008" »

July 21, 2007

ABX Mortgage Index

A way to measure the effects of problems in the sub-prime mortgage
sector is to look at Credit Default Swaps (CDS). Remember that these
CDS contracts effectively work as a kind of insurance policy for banks
or other holders of bad mortgages. If the mortgage goes bad, then
the seller of the CDS must pay the bank for the lost mortgage payments
(alternatively ... if the mortgage stays good then the seller makes a lot
of money).

The index that measures the CDS market for home equity is called
the ABX.HE index. The sub-variation of this index that refers to risky
sub-prime loans is called the ABX.HE BBB index.
Markit's ABX catalog.

Continue reading "ABX Mortgage Index" »

July 15, 2007

Bond Market Association, Securities Industry and Financial Markets

SIFMA, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
represents the industry (eponymously)..

Born of the merger between The Securities Industry Association and
The Bond Market Association, SIFMA is a 'single powerful voice'.

Example publication: Mortgage Prepayment Projection Tables,
PSA Median, CPR average, etc.

More in Quant Finance, mortgage.

July 12, 2007

Morgage Doom by Roubini

Nouriel Roubini preaches doom for the mortgage world.
Quantified doom is rather small though.

July 8, 2007

Mortgages for nerds

Tanta's ubernerd tour of the mortgage business.

Mortgage Servicing
Negative Amortization
FICOs and AUS
Private Mortgage Insurance
Foreclosure and REO
MBS
Delinquency and Default
Reverse Mortgages

June 30, 2007

Subprime Mortgages Meet Stricter Federal Rules

“Stated income and reduced documentation loans to subprime
borrowers should be accepted only if there are mitigating
factors that clearly minimize the need for direct verification
of repayment capacity,”

“However,” the regulators added, “a higher interest rate is
not considered an acceptable mitigating factor.”

Federal Financial Regulatory Agencies Issue Final Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending. [PDF]

Posted in mortgage.

Continue reading "Subprime Mortgages Meet Stricter Federal Rules" »

June 15, 2007

Bankers Online

bankersonline resource for banking regulation and practices.
Example: HMDA tour (eg Borrower Isn't
Homeowner, HMDA Reportable ? )

Continue reading "Bankers Online" »

June 11, 2007

Cash back at closing -- Mortgage fraud ?

First he built a dictionary of 150 keywords in real estate
ads — “creative financing,” for instance — that might
signal a seller’s willingness to play loose. He then looked
for instances in which a house had languished on the
market and yet wound up selling at or even above the
final asking price. In such cases, he found that buyers
typically paid a very small down payment; the smaller
the down payment, in fact, the higher the price they
paid for the house. What could this mean?

Either the most highly leveraged buyers were terrible
bargainers — or, as Ben-David concluded, such anomalies
indicated the artificial inflation that marked a cash-back deal.

Having isolated the suspicious transactions in the data,
Ben-David could now examine the noteworthy traits they
shared. He found that a small group of real estate agents
were repeatedly involved, in particular when the seller was
himself an agent or when there was no second agent in the
deal. Ben-David also found that the suspect transactions
were more likely to occur when the lending bank, rather
than keeping the mortgage, bundled it up with thousands
of others and sold them off as mortgage-backed securities.

This suggests that the issuing banks treat suspect mortgages
with roughly the same care as you might treat a rental car,
knowing that you aren’t responsible for its long-term outcome
once it is out of your possession.

-- Freakonomic pf the week.

June 5, 2007

House flipper fraud: Flip This House, Sam Leccima in Atlanta

'Flip This House' Star Accused of Fraud

On an episode of A&E's popular reality series "Flip This House," Atlanta
businessman Sam Leccima sits in front of a run-down house and calls
buying and selling real estate his passion.

Now authorities and legal filings claim that Leccima's true passion was
a series of scams that included faking the home renovations shown on
the cable TV show and claiming to have sold houses he never owned.

"This is, indeed, a con artist," said Sonya McGee, an Atlanta pharmaceutical
representative who says Leccima took $4,000 from her in an investment
scheme.

Continue reading "House flipper fraud: Flip This House, Sam Leccima in Atlanta" »

June 4, 2007

ARM Handbook

Adjustable Rate Mortgage Handbook by the Federal Reserve.

May 28, 2007

What is Sub Prime Today ?

MacroBlog opines on the state of sub-prime lending today.
More at Federal Reserve's April Survey of Senior Loan Officers [pdf].

Continue reading "What is Sub Prime Today ?" »

May 16, 2007

When to refinance: a financial engineer's optimal mortgage refinance

Kalotay's perspective on personal finance planning.

See previously Kalotay on mortgage option theory, formal modelling of
optimized mortgage refinancing, and option theoretic prepayment models.

May 15, 2007

Wallstfolly on subprime meltdown

The meltdown in sub-prime mortgages explicated by Wall Street Folly.

May 4, 2007

Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM)

The bulk of reverse mortgages funded today are
so-called Home Equity Conversion Mortgages,
known as HECMs, which are insured by the
federal government and cap the amount
homeowners can borrow.

To cater to people with higher-value homes,
lenders increasingly are creating their own
products that don't have loan limits.
Meanwhile, the increased competition
among lenders also is driving down the
overall costs for consumers.

Continue reading "Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM)" »

April 20, 2007

FHA mortgage limit should be $600,000

The government has fairly low limits on how big a mortgage
it will insure, so borrowers in New York City, for instance,
can receive a loan of about $363,000, far less than the
area’s median home price of about $470,000.

In Fairfield County, Conn., the maximum F.H.A. loan for a single-family
home is about $363,000, but the median price in the county’s largest
municipalities is $473,000.

Congress is considering raising the maximum loan to about $600,000, which
“would obviously help a lot of borrowers, especially in the Northeast.”

-- Brian J. Chappelle, founder of Potomac Partners in Washington,
consultants to the mortgage industry.

Continue reading "FHA mortgage limit should be $600,000" »

April 17, 2007

Predatory borrowers

Am I the only one who wonders how a person who borrows
money he can't repay, buys a house he can't afford, and then
stiffs his creditors, is allowed to play the victim?

-- Michael Lewis

April 16, 2007

Mortgage delinquency vs job growth/unemployment

As problem mortgages increase, lenders have tightened their
standards, adding further to pressures on the housing market.
As long as job growth remains strong, the housing downturn
will not derail the economy
, but the impact on consumer
spending is likely to be "more pronounced".

-- Mark Zandi, chief economist of Moody's Economy.com


Continue reading "Mortgage delinquency vs job growth/unemployment" »

April 10, 2007

Owning a home is for debtors, not just the rich

owning-a-house.gif

By Toothpaste for Dinner.

Owning a home is for debtors, not just the rich.

March 24, 2007

Safe from Sub-prime in the suburbs ?

Even affluent suburbs have their share of such borrowers.

Steven Habetz, chief executive of Threshold Mortgage, a
broker based on Westport, Conn., says subprime loans
account for about 5 percent of his business. That could
drop, though, as lenders leave the market.

March 19, 2007

Mortgage rate reset: Cagan and First American

First American CoreLogic projected the impact of ratereset as it relates
to mortage payment increases and foreclosure.

"Mortgage Payment Reset: The Issue and the Impact," is available at www.firstamres.com/MPR2007.

March 6, 2007

Few loans cause many losses

About 20% of the loans in the subprime market "cause more than half the losses.

-- Goldman Sachs Group Inc. fixed-income strategist Michael Marschoun.

We hope this is an ex ante statement. Ex post, we would think that fewer
than 8% of all mortgages cause 100 % of losses.

Continue reading "Few loans cause many losses" »

February 8, 2007

Risk-based Capital Requirements for Mortgage Assets

Risk-based Capital Requirements for Mortgage Assets, by the Federal Reserve. [ PDF ]

January 2, 2007

FDIC Summer Outlook 2006

Historical developments in mortgage loan volume and underwriting trends.
The significance of recent market and institutional innovations in light of
historical trends, reviews mortgage loan performance trends, discusses
the role of regulation, and considers the near-term outlook for the
mortgage lending cycle.

FDIC Summer Outlook 2006 PDF.

Continue reading "FDIC Summer Outlook 2006" »

December 16, 2006

Shared Appreciation Mortgages: Lessons from the UK

The recent rise in shared appreciation mortgage (SAM) availability motivates
careful consideration of underlying borrower incentives. The lender's share
of appreciation in SAMs (share) is essentially a dynamic prepayment penalty
imposed on the borrower. However, the borrower faces a moral hazard
due to his ability to affect the penalty by reducing maintenance.

We adapt a competing risks mortgage-pricing model to calculate SAM
theoretical equilibrium rates. Our borrower possesses rational expectations
of both the house price market and interest rates. Our simulation results may
help explain the lack of secondary market interest for the UK SAMs containing
extreme contract terms.

Keywords:
Shared appreciation, mortgage pricing, options, prepayment penalty, default

JEL Classifications: G21

Sanders, Anthony B. and Slawson Jr., V. Carlos,
"Shared Appreciation Mortgages: Lessons from the UK" (July 2005).
Available at SSRN.

Continue reading "Shared Appreciation Mortgages: Lessons from the UK" »

December 15, 2006

Moody's Commercial Mortgage Metrics (Moody's CMM)

Moody's Commercial Mortgage Metrics (Moody's CMM)

TWC/CMM

Commercial Mortgage Metrics from Moody’s and TWR,
the leading source for commercial real estate performance
and valuation forecasting.

Risk Measures provided by CMM:

Probability of Default,
Loss Given Default,
Expected Loss,
Value at Risk,
Yield Degradation,
Risk Adjusted Yield,
Distance to Default.

December 14, 2006

Anatomy of mortgage prepayments, Hayre L.S., Chaudary S. et

Hayre L.S., Chaudary S. et Young R.A. : "Anatomy of prepayments",
Journal of Fixed Income, 10, 2000. [PDF]
The paper is actually in chapter 4 of Hayre's book:
SSB's guide to MBS and ABS.

December 8, 2006

Option Adjusted Spreads: The OAS Trilogy

Trilogy by Andrew Davidson and Co (AdCo)
1. Active Passive Decomposition
2. Prepay risk and option adjusted valuation concept
3. prOAS Valuation model with refinancing and turnover risk

November 21, 2006

Who's Who: mortgage economists: Frank Nothaft, Freddie Mac

"What really increases the risk of mortgage
default is if you have this payment shock coupled
with a weak economy, because a weak economy
means unemployment,"

"Family incomes are lower. And then if you layer
on top of that a payment shock, that's a trigger
event that may very well lead to a default."

quote, Frank Nothaft, chief economist at Freddie Mac.

Economic commentary, 2003-2005

Continue reading "Who's Who: mortgage economists: Frank Nothaft, Freddie Mac" »

October 30, 2006

Tranched mortgage pools

The fun is tranching pools of mortgages into different securities.
You take a package of mortgages, preferably from different areas
of the country, and then you create different tranches with
different credit qualities, and then one zero coupon that bears
all the residual risk.

The first tranch, naturally, gets all the guarenteed income stream
(mortgage payments) and bears *no* (or actaully, very little)
prepayment risk (it is good to maturity).

The next tranch gets income stream, and bears some prepayment
risk (if there are a lot of prepayments, it gets a swath if the other
tranches are fully repaid), and on down the line.

The last tranch before the zero gets income, but bears risk
if the income falls short (mortgages default), and also bears
*the most* risk for prepayment (it has a call option owned
by the mortgage holders, they can repay the loan if the
interest rate changes). If you own this last tranch, you have
lots of duration and gamma risk, whereas if you own the
first tranch you have a very different profile.

The 'residual zero' tranch is practically binary.

Either it pays off, or it defaults and gets the (last) bit of
recovery value in liquidation. Lots of folks use equity
models to calculate expected return on these.

Freddie and Fannie do this, but also Morgan Stanley and Goldman.
If you want to play, you can call them and they can cobble toghether
a structured deal that will match pretty much any flavor you want.
Some of their customers are developers who are highly exposed
to one geographic area (say, Toll Brothers) and need hedging.

A good intro book is Collateralized Mortgage Obligations
by Chuck Ramsey and Frank Fabozzi
. It goes beyond CMOs and
talks about a lot of the risk horizons and what traders of these
do and play with. Lots of former interest rate traders apparently
do well in this field.


As far as point three: you are talking 'real options' theory here,
and you have to look for a lot of asset value delta to overcome
the (identified) barriers to exit and entry and transactions costs.
I have yet to see a good book on the real options of real estate,
but the ones that come close deal with mineral rights and land
and mostly were developed for energy exploration. Not really
'commercial' or 'residential' real options.

Continue reading "Tranched mortgage pools" »

October 9, 2006

Interest rates, what moves mortgage rates?

So what moves mortgage rates ? Supply. Demand.
Competition for money. Inflation. The Economy.
Expectations. And you, of course.

September 1, 2006

Mortgage economists, who's who 1: Scott Anderson at Wells Fargo

Scott Anderson at Wells Fargo: bio.

Scott Anderson holds a doctorate in economics with an
emphasis in monetary theory and international trade
and finance from George Washington University. He is
responsible for analysis and forecasting of international,
national and regional economic trends. His areas of focus
include macroeconomic and interest rate forecasting,
financial markets, and international economics.

Mr. Anderson provides daily analyses of U.S. economic
news, and produces the Wells Fargo Economics macroeconomic
forecasts. He authors the bi-monthly Wells Fargo California
Outlook report and co-authors Wells Fargo’s weekly Financial
Market Strategies report and the monthly Economic Indicators
report. In addition, he covers the United Kingdom, China, South
Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore as part of our
bi-monthly international report.

Mr. Anderson's research is widely read by the financial
and business community and he has appeared in
numerous media including: CNN, Bloomberg, MSNBC,
CBS MarketWatch, BBC, NPR, Wall Street Journal, New York
Times, Financial Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles
Times, Chicago Tribune, USA Today, San Francisco
Chronicle.

Mr. Anderson joined Wells Fargo as senior economist in 2001.

Citation: decade of flat home prices.

August 8, 2006

Rent to mortgage payment ratio

Rent to mortgage payment ratio.

Mortgage payments are senitive to interest rates.
Are rents less sensitive to interest rates ?

Then why would we exprect a constant
mortgage payment to rent ratio ?

August 7, 2006

TBMA Mortgage Prepayment Projection Tables

TBMA Mortgage Prepayment Projection Tables: Questions and Answers

TBMA = The Bond Market Association.

Continue reading "TBMA Mortgage Prepayment Projection Tables" »

August 6, 2006

Hedging beyond duration and convexity

Hedging beyond duration and convexity.

By considering a representation using a Fourier-like harmonic,
empirical evidence that such a series provides our hedging
strategy on a mortgage-backed security (MBS) with the first
four principal components of yield curve.

Continue reading "Hedging beyond duration and convexity" »

August 5, 2006

mortgagebankers

Mortgage Bankers have an association; news on refinancing, prepayment,
orginations, servicing, delinquency, foreclosures, MBS, ABS, securitization.

More like this: mortgage.

July 16, 2006

Two-Factor Mortgage Valuation Model: How Much Do House Prices Matter?

An Empirical Test of a Two-Factor Mortgage Valuation Model:
How Much Do House Prices Matter?

Mortgage-backed securities, with their relative structural simplicity
and their lack of recovery rate uncertainty if default occurs, are
particularly suitable for developing and testing risky debt valuation
models. A two-factor structural mortgage pricing model in which
rational mortgage-holders endogenously choose when to prepay
and default subject to
i. explicit frictions (transaction costs) payable when terminating
their mortgages,
ii. exogenous background terminations, and
iii. a credit related impact of the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) on
prepayment.

We estimate the model using pool-level mortgage termination data
for Freddie Mac Participation Certificates, and find that the effect of
the house price factor on the results is both statistically and
economically significant. Out-of-sample estimates of MBS prices
produce option adjusted spreads of between 5 and 25 basis
points, well within quoted values for these securities.

SUGGESTED CITATION:
Chris Downing, Richard Stanton, and Nancy E. Wallace,
An Empirical Test of a Two-Factor Mortgage Valuation Model:
How Much Do House Prices Matter
?
(link to 406 K, PDF file)

Chris Downing, Federal Reserve Board, Washington, DC
Richard Stanton, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley
Nancy E. Wallace, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley

Continue reading "Two-Factor Mortgage Valuation Model: How Much Do House Prices Matter?" »

July 12, 2006

Mortgage Valuation and Optimal Refinancing, Pliska

An equilibrium valuation of fixed-rate mortgage contracts in
discrete time -- the mortgagor’s prepayment behavior
described by intensity process and with exogenous mortgage
rates, the value of the contract is derived in an explicit form
that can be interpreted as the principal balance plus the
value of a certain swap.

A nonlinear equation for what the mortgage rate in a
competitive market, and thus mortgage rates are endogenous
and depend upon the mortgagor’s prepayment behavior.

The complementary problem, where mortgage rates are
exogenous and the mortgagor seeks the optimal refinancing
strategy, is then solved via a Markov decision chain.

Finally, the equilibrium problem, where the mortgagor
is a representative agent in the economy who seeks the
optimal refinancing strategy and where the mortgage
rates are endogenous, is developed, solved, and analysed.


Mortgage Valuation and Optimal Refinancing, Stanley R. Pliska:
shorter and longer versions.

Continue reading "Mortgage Valuation and Optimal Refinancing, Pliska" »

June 14, 2006

Landholders, Residential Land Conversion, and Market Signals

In some metropolitan real estate markets, large land dealers
considerably influence the conversion of land for residential
use. Their activities may affect the timing, direction, and type
of new development. This study uses the Cleveland, Ohio
metropolitan region to consider whether large landholders
play a major role in residential land conversion in suburban
markets and the extent to which their actions are driven by
market signals.

Continue reading "Landholders, Residential Land Conversion, and Market Signals" »

June 13, 2006

The Complexities of Mortgage Options (Prendergast)

Mortgage option prices behave quite differently than the prices of
options on underlying securities that do not exhibit significant
convexity. As a result, the intuition of many market participants
about option risk characteristics does not typically apply to
mortgage options.

The risk characteristics of these options: negative convexity of
the underlying mortgage and the positive gamma of the option
impact call option convexity in opposing directions. As a result,
call option convexity can be either positive or negative,
depending on the interest rate scenario and option specification.

On the other hand, a mortgage put option is always positively convex.
A quantitative understanding of these risk characteristics is critical
for money managers and broker/dealers who use mortgage options.

The Complexities of Mortgage Options
Prendergast, Joseph R.
THE JOURNAL OF FIXED INCOME
March 2003